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We consider a new type of attack on a coherent quantum key distribution protocol [coherent
one-way (COW) protocol]. The main idea of the attack consists in measuring individually the
intercepted states and sending the rest of them unchanged. We have calculated the optimum values
of the attack parameters for an arbitrary length of a channel length and compared this novel attack
with a standard beam-splitting attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Breakthrough in methods of manipulation for individ-
ual quantum systems plays a crucial role for the im-
plementation of quantum technologies. Quantum tech-
nologies have a significant potential for design of com-
puters [1–3] and communications devices [4]. The use of
quantum systems in the role of basic structural elements
in computer allows one to achieve considerable improve-
ment in a number of tasks [3] such as search in unstruc-
tured databases [5], and in integer factoring and discrete
logarithm problems [6]. The last problems are of signifi-
cant importance for public-key cryptography [7, 8], which
is based on the complexity of these tasks for classical com-
puters. But these tasks can be solved faster using quan-
tum computers. This endangers the existing methods of
information security using cryptographic tools. Further-
more, the absence of an efficient non-quantum algorithm
for solving these problems still remains unproved.
In fact, appearance of quantum computing device lim-
its possible tools for cryptography by two methods. The
first is to use problems without both classical and quan-
tum efficient algorithms as novel public-key cryptogra-
phy schemes. These methods are in foundations of post-
quantum cryptography [9]. However, it is an open prob-
lem whether it is possible to design an effective algorithm
that solves these problem, so the post-quantum cryptog-
raphy keeps to be potentially vulnerable.
Another possible solution is to use cryptography with
a private key. On the one hand, these systems (at cer-
tain conditions) are absolutely secure [10]. If legitimate
users (Alice and Bob) have identical random private keys,
which are used only once, with the size being equal or
greater than the size of the message, then according to
the Shannon theorem messages encrypted using such key
via the one-time pad scheme [11] cannot be decrypted by
an eavesdropper (Eve). On the other hand, however, dis-
tribution of keys satisfying these demands is challenging.
Towards the solution of this problem one can use the
resource of quantum systems [4]. By transmitting infor-
mation using individual quantum objects (e.g., single
photons) security is guaranteed by the principles of quan-
tum physics [12, 13]. First is that the arbitrary quantum
state cannot be cloned according to the no-cloning theo-
rem [14]. Second reason is that the pair of non-orthogonal
states cannot be discriminated with unit probability.
Furthermore, any measurement leads to distortion or an-
nihilation of a quantum state. Thus, by distribution of a
key with the use of single photons one can obtain a setup,
which allows observing of inception in the key generation
process. Consequently, this opens a possibility to design
a novel architecture for telecommunications systems, in
which information security is guaranteed by the funda-
mentals laws of physics. Nevertheless, imperfections of
technical realizations of key distribution systems such as
absorption of photons in an optical fiber, efficiency of
single-photon detectors, and possible actions of an eaves-
dropper exploiting these vulnerabilities lead to possible
attacks. In particular, if the length of a quantum chan-
nel exceeds a certain value then it is impossible to ensure
confidentiality of key distribution [13].
It should be noted that attacks on quantum key dis-
tribution systems can be divided into two classes. The
first class is attacks on quantum key distribution pro-
tocols. It is commonly understood that the quantum
key distribution protocol is a general scheme of prepa-
ration and measurement of quantum states, and proce-
dure of obtaining of a key on Alice and Bob sides from
results of measurements of quantum states. The first
quantum key distribution protocol is BB84. When con-
sidering the attacks of this class, it is traditionally as-
sumed [12, 13] that an eavesdropper has all technological
resources, which do not contradict the physic laws, such
as quantum computer, quantum memory, and an ideal
channel for transmitting of quantum states. Of course,
the practical realization of the considered attack essen-
tially depends on the required technological resources.
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2The second class presumes attacks on hardware realiza-
tion of quantum-cryptographic systems (so-called “quan-
tum hacking”) [15–17]. For example, this is attacks on
particular type of single-photon detectors [17].
Quantum key distribution systems are available on the
market. Nevertheless, the way to their implementation
encounters with a number of technological challenges.
One of the most promising methods of operating with
quantum systems used in commercial devices consists of
using coherent states of light for quantum key distribu-
tions (such as coherent one-way protocol, COW) [18–20].
These protocols are inspired by classical communications
with optical fiber systems [20]. The most significant ad-
vantage of the COW protocol is simplicity of its real-
ization [13, 18–20], which is related to its simple optical
scheme. This protocol is easy to implement in experi-
ment, and it has been used in the project on the design
of European network for quantum key distribution SEC-
OQC [21]. However, despite prevalence of this method
and its high practical importance, an analysis of the pos-
sibility of attacks, which give to an eavesdropper an op-
portunity to obtain information about a quantum key, is
an important task [18–26]. We note that lower bounds
on the key generation rate of a variant of the coherent-
one-way quantum key distribution protocol have been ob-
tained in Ref. [27].
We note that quantum key distribution systems are
not communication systems in the full sense. The quan-
tum resource in the form of single photons is used not for
information transmitting, but for generation of a random
identical for legitimate users sequence of bits (key). The
typical generation rate is such systems is about 10 kbit/s
on the distances 50–80 km. It is a limitation of such sys-
tems that for generation of keys for legitimate users the
direct channel is needed (i.e., “point-to-point” network
topology). After distribution of a keys, it can be used for
encryption on the one-time-pad regime or as a source of
entropy. The final speed of information transmitting in
such a case depends on the speed of the communication
system transmitting encrypted information.
In this work, we consider a novel attack on the coher-
ent quantum key distribution protocol. The key idea of
the proposed attack is using of individual measurements
of intercepted states and transfer of the remaining part
in an unmodified form. The suggested attack belongs to
the first class (attacks on the protocol). One of its ad-
vantages is the fact that realization of this attack does
not require using of the quantum memory or sophisti-
cated elements, but it is limited to a common assump-
tion that an eavesdropper has a channel without losses.
In the rest, the suggested attack has rather simple op-
tical scheme for its realization, allowing one to gain an
advantage in comparison with the known beam-splitting
attack under certain restrictions on the parameters of a
key distribution system.
II. COW PROTOCOL
In the COW protocol for quantum key distribution Al-
ice and Bob use a coherent state |α〉 in a one of two time
slots, whereas the vacuum state is in another window, to
encode two information states with bit values 0 and 1.
Therefore, the corresponding states can be presented in
the following form:
|ψ0〉 = |α〉 ⊗ |0〉, |ψ1〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |α〉, (1)
where µ = |α|2 stands for the intensity of the coherent
state |α〉.
A straightforward scenario of attack in quantum cryp-
tography is the “intercept and resend” attack. In this at-
tack, Eve tries to measure the state in each time slot and
resent of the resulting state (with amplification compen-
sating losses). In order to detect an eavesdropper, using
this attack, in addition to the information states Alice
and Bob employ the decoy states of the following form:
|ψc〉 = |α〉 ⊗ |α〉. (2)
The decoy states are used to detect attempts to distin-
guish between information states. During the attack an
eavesdropper occasionally sends the information states
instead the decoy states that would allow to detect it.
The fraction of the decoy states is denoted as f , it is
typically about 10%.
III. BEAM-SPLITTING ATTACK
ON THE COW PROTOCOL
In real optical fibers there is attenuation of signals lead-
ing to the fact that Bob obtains states of lower intensity.
The intensity of states obtained by Bob is as follows:
µB = µ10
− δl10 , (3)
where l is the length (in km), and δ is the attenuation
coefficient (typical value of the attenuation coefficient for
optical fibers is about 0.2 dB/km).
In an analysis of attacks on the quantum key distri-
bution protocol one can assume that Eve has unlimited
technological resources. That is why one of the possi-
ble scenario is to use a beam splitter together with ideal
identical channel (e.g. by means of quantum teleporta-
tion). Since states transform in a self-similar way both
on a beamsplitter and in optical channel with attenua-
tion, Eve can take a part of a state using beam-splitting
with sending of the remaining part to Bob via channel
replaced on the ideal one.
Maximal value of the intensity that Eve can take has
the following form:
µmaxE = µ− µB = µ(1− 10−
δl
10 ). (4)
From viewpoint of Bob, this modification of transferred
states using a beamsplitter does not differs from losses,
3and it cannot be detected. Further strategy of Eve is
different for various attacks.
We consider the scenario of a beam-splitting attack, in
which Eve stores the withdrawn states in order to then
extract information [25]. The set of states and measure-
ments on the receiver side is such that if there is no Eve
(as well as in the case of its withdrawal of a fraction of
state and sending using a lossless channel) the Bob has
zero quantum bit error rate (QBER), and the mutual
information between Alice and Bob is equal to 1 after
discarding inconclusive outcomes. Since Eva has less in-
formation, then in this attacks she introduces additional
errors in order to make her information equal to the Bob
information. Thus, information states of Eve in this at-
tack are as follows:
|ψE0 〉 = |
√
µmaxE 〉 ⊗ |0〉, |ψE1 〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |
√
µmaxE 〉. (5)
The information, which can be extracted from such
states by Eve at a collective measurement, is given by
the Holevo quantity (χ-value) [28]:
IAE = χ({|ψE0 〉, |ψE1 〉}), (6)
It is easy to find a critical value of QBER, which Eve
should add in order to make her information equal to
Bob’s information. The critical value of the QBER can
be expressed via the binary entropy function as follows:
IAB = 1− h2(QBER), (7)
where h2(QBER) is the binary entropy function.
The strong side of the beam-splitting attack is using
of the collective measurements over the entire transmit-
ted sequence, that allows one to achieve the χ-value due
the quantum superadditivity and obtain the theoretical
maximum of information from these states. However the
disadvantage of such an attack is that the critical value
of the QBER does not tend to zero at large lengths of
the channel since the Eve information is limited by the
χ-value of initial states. At the same time, the longer is
the channel, the higher are the losses, and one can use
this fact by blocking some of the states, whose informa-
tion had not been extracted.
IV. ACTIVE BEAM-SPLITTING ATTACK ON
THE COW PROTOCOL
In the present work, we suggest an alternative scenario
to attack the COW protocol. The difference from the
beam-splitting attack is as follows. First, in the consid-
ered attack Eve withdraws smaller part of states rather
than in the beam-splitting attack, but still needs chan-
nel with lower losses. Second, the eavesdropper performs
individual measurements. In the case of the inconclusive
results of measurements (i.e., at the detection of vacuum
states in both positions) Eve is able to block state since
the information is inaccessible. At the same time, in a
general case Eve is unable to block all such states due to
the fact that in this case the intensity on the receiver side
is lower than it is expected, which discovers Eve. There-
fore, in order to estimate the efficiency of this attack we
consider the idea similar to that in the beam-splitting
attack, i.e., in the cases where the length of the chan-
nel makes it impossible for Eve to block all states, of
which information is not extracted, she introduces errors
to make the Bob information equal to the Eve informa-
tion. We refer this attack as the active beam-splitting
attack since its using depends on ability of extracting
information from withdrawn states by Eve.
We describe details of actions of Eve with taking into
account all the parameters. Eve withdraws a fraction of
states with intensity µE and implements measurements
of each time slot of the state. The measurement in each
time slot is described by the following observable:
M0 = |0〉〈0|, M1 =
∞∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|. (8)
The probability to obtain the result 1 at the measurement
of the state with intensity µE reads
pinfconc = 1− e−µE . (9)
This expression gives the probability to obtain the con-
clusive result at the measurement of the information state
(1) but with lower intensity. At the transmitting of the
decoy state, the probability of the conclusive result is as
follows:
pcontconc = 2e
−µE (1− e−µE ) + (1− e−µE )2. (10)
Thus, the total probability of the conclusive result by
Eve taking into account the fraction of the decoy states
is the following:
pEconc = (1− f)× pinfconc + f × pcontconc. (11)
It should be noted that the use of the decoy states does
not allow to detect Eve since she still sends a fraction
of states without measurements. Possible errors due
to wrong distinctions of the information and the decoy
states does not lead do decrease of the Eve information,
because the recordings about decoy states do not partic-
ipate in the generation of the sifted key.
In the case of inconclusive result of Eve measurement,
the probability of which is equal to 1 − pEconc, Eve seeks
to block states transmitting to Bob. In a general case,
Eve is able to implement this not universally but for a
small fraction of states to make this undetectable on the
receiver side due to the large attenuation. We calculate
this fraction of states, which can be blocked.
Bob expects states with intensity (3). For these states
the probability to obtain the conclusive result for infor-
mation states is equal to 1−e−µB . In the reality, by using
a beamsplitter Eve can keep for Bob states of higher in-
tensity in order to block useless states, then the intensity
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Figure 1. The critical value of the QBER for the standard beam-splitting attack (dashed line) and the considered active
beam-splitting attack (solid line) for three different values of intensity µ = 0.1 (a), µ = 0.2 (b), and µ = 0.5 (c) are shows as
function of the channel length.
of Bob is µ′B = µ − µE . Consequently, permissible frac-
tion of states b blocked by Eve can be obtained from the
relation
(1− b)(1− e−µ′B ) = 1− e−µB . (12)
The fraction of blocked states can be determined for a
given channel length and parameters of the Eve attack,
in particular, the intensity of withdraw states. This in-
tensity varies from zero to the maximal intensity µmaxE
given by expression (4). For each channel length Eve is
able to chose the part of withdraw states maximizing her
information.
The Eve’s information can be calculated as follows.
The information is equal to unity for the cases, where Eve
has conclusive results. At the same time, for an arbitrary
channel length Eve cannot block all states, where she
extracted no information, then she still should send them
to Bob. For the probability of the conclusive result and
the probability of state block b, determined be Eq. (12),
we have
IAE =
pinfconc
1− b . (13)
One can see that if Eve is able to block all states with
the inconclusive result of the measurement (i.e., if b =
1−pinfconc), then her information is equal to unity. It is use-
less to consider the case, where the value b is greater that
the probability of the inconclusive result of the measure-
ment, whereas at lower values Eve information decreases
with the minimum at the case of absence of states block,
which is equal to the probability of the conclusive mea-
surement result, and it is the capacity of the channel with
the attenuation.
We consider a question about choice of the optimal
value of the intensity of withdraw signal µE maximizing
the withdraw information IAE . By using expression (9)
and expression (12) defining the value of the fraction of
blocked by Eve states b, we then rewrite (13) as follows:
IAE =
(1− e−µ+µE ) (1− e−µE )
1− eµB . (14)
It is clear that IAE in a convex function of the argument
µE , which has a maximum at µE = µ/2. However, since
the intensity µE is bounded by the value µ
max
E the max-
imum value of the withdraw information is achieved at
µE = min (µ
max
E , µ/2) (15)
We note that in the case µE = µ
max
E we have µ
max
E = µ
′
E
and b = 1. Thus, at µE < µ/2 the optimal strategy for
Eve is to do not block states at all and send all messages
to Bob.
The critical length lcritat which it is reasonable for Eve
to start block states is defined by the expression,
1− 10− δlcrit10 = 1/2, (16)
and it can be calculated as follows:
lcrit = 10 log10 2/δ = 3/δ. (17)
For a typical value δ = 0.2 dB/km, we then have lcrit =
15 km.
V. DISCUSSIONS OF RESULTS
In conclusion, we one more time briefly describe a sce-
nario of the considered attack and the method of finding
of the critical QBER in the protocol. For a given value
of the channel length, Eve calculates the maximal in-
tensity of states, which can be withdrawn. Then, she
considers possibility of withdraw of states with different
intensity from zero to the maximal value. For each state
one can calculate the fraction of states, which Eve can
block, and the Eve information. The greater is the inten-
sity of the state received by Bob, the larger fraction can
be blocked. Eve chooses the intensity maximizing her in-
formation. If she can block all states with inconclusive
results of measurements, Eve is able to attack without
introducing of additional error, and the protocol is to-
tally insecure. However, if the fraction of states, which
can be blocked, is lower, then Eve incorporates errors in
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Figure 2. The optimal intensity in a presence of active beam-
splitting attack for different channel lengths (dotted line), the
critical QBER at the optimal choice of the intensity by Eve
(solid line), and the critical QBER of the corresponding beam-
splitting attack at the same intensity (dashed line).
the channel between Alice and Bob in order to offset the
difference between Bob’s and her information. The mini-
mum value of errors, whereby their information are equal
to each other, is a critical value of the QBER of the pro-
tocol against this attack. The critical value of QBER for
the standard beam-splitting attack and the considered
active beam-splitting attack for three different values of
intensity (µ = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5) are shows as function of
the channel length in Fig. 1.
The question may arise as to which the intensity of
the initial state is optimal for legitimate users under the
assumption that the eavesdropper uses this particular at-
tack. On the one hand, it is clear that in order to increase
the critical QBER they have to take the lowest intensity
of the initial states. On the other hand, low intensity of
the initial states leads to low key generation rate because
of too large proportion of too many states are lost.
We can find the optimal intensity as follows. As-
sume that Eve uses withdraw of the maximum fraction
of states, however without incorporation of errors in the
communication channel between Alice and Bob (since the
value of errors is not the mark). The length of secret key
of Alice and Bob recalculated on a single state is given
by difference between the information between Alice and
Bob IAB and the information between Alice and Eve IAE .
The first is equal to the capacity of the erasure channel
with erasure probability equal to e−µB , the second can be
calculated by using Eq. (13) and then multiplying on the
probability of the conclusive result of Bob. Therefore,
the optimal value of the intensity for the given value of
the channel is those, which maximizes the difference
IAB − IAE = 1− e−µB − (1− e−µB )p
inf
conc
1− b . (18)
Fig. 2 shows the optimal intensity for different channel
lengths and the critical value at the optimal choice of
the intensity if Eve uses this attack. For a comparison,
we add the critical value of QBER for the beam-splitting
attack at the fixed length and given choice of intensity,
however, we note that the initial intensity is optimized on
the basis of the assumption that the eavesdropper uses
the active beam-splitting attack.
The disadvantage of this attack is that Eve is unable
to amplify the signal transmitting to Bob for the states,
where she has the conclusive results. Another weak side
of the attack is that Eve has to measure at once, which
it eliminates the possibility of achieving of the super-
additive information. On the other hand, in contrast
to the usual attacks with a beam splitter, such the at-
tack, starting with the critical channel length, is possible
without introducing of additional errors. However, the
attack with unambiguous measurements [26] is more ef-
fective since it is possible to enhance the intensity of the
premises from which all the information can be extracted.
The advantages of the considered attack can also be at-
tributed relatively simple technical implementation.
Thus, the discussed active beam-splitting attack is in-
teresting primarily as implemented in the current techno-
logical level than the optimum in terms of the eavesdrop-
per, limited only by the laws of physics. The develop-
ment of the idea of unchanged forwarding states seems to
be topical in the context of other quantum-cryptography
protocols that are based on the use of coherent states.
We note also that despite the fact that the considered
attack does not lead to a change of the status type (de-
coy state can not be transformed into a signal, and vice
versa), it leads to a distortion of the statistics getting
decoy or information states. This phenomenon is due to
both the change in the intensity of the pulses sent to Bob
(by µB or µ
′
B), and that the blocking probability able to
determine the probability of getting conclusive result by
Eve. In turn, in the case of this decoy state likelihood
is higher than in the case of the signal, and the total
probability of obtaining the decoy state increases. As
a result, the attack can be considered potentially reg-
istered by taking into account statistical registration of
decoy states in the classical post-processing key. Usually,
however, the protocol is considered a requirement of the
absence of conditions such as change, and such registra-
tion statistics require a significant change in the protocol
in terms of evaluation of the interceptor information.
An interesting and relevant question is about required
modification of the COW protocol for taking into account
the proposed attack. However, this question further anal-
ysis, and it is beyond the scope of this work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a new type of attack on a
coherent quantum key distribution protocol COW with
the use of an active beam splitter. The optimum values
of the parameters of attack for an arbitrary length of
the channel were calculated, and the comparison with a
standard beam-splitting attack was performed .
6The advantage of the considered attack is rather sim-
ple technical implementation. It should be noted that
the suggested attack is actual, in fact, for channels of
arbitrary length. However, it is of special interest for
quantum-cryptographic systems operating in an urban
environment and using short (30–50 km) urban fiber-
optic communication lines with fairly high losses. In re-
cent experiments on quantum key distribution in urban
conditions, losses in the channel of 30 km length have
been on the level of 11 dB at the key generation rate on
the level of 0.5 kbit/s [29] after post processing [30].
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